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Software Defined Networking (SDN) introduced a new capability for programmers where
network traffic could be managed unlike ever before. Whereas traditional network man-
agement solutions are rigid and limited to manual configurations, SDN allows for creative
and adaptive solutions to common networking challenges. One of these key challenges is
security, and specifically how to protect a network from attackers. This thesis develops
and implements a process to rapidly respond to host level security events using SDN flow
table updates, role-based flow classes, and Advanced Messaging Queuing Protocol to auto-
matically update configuration of switching devices and block malicious traffic. By pushing
security event information from each host to the controller and maintaining a security index
for each host at the controller, the entire network is better protected from attackers.
A prototypical SDN-controlled network is constructed consisting of five hosts, one mes-
sage broker, one controller, and one switch are used to measure system performance. Events
are generated at each host to measure the Event Completion Time (ECT), Event Success
Rate (ESR), and Message Delivery Time (MDT). These metrics are used to compare how
the system performs as the number of events is varied between 1,000 to 50,000. Further
analysis is performed to explain system response variations and make implementation rec-
ommendations.
Results show flow table updates are completed for all tested levels in less than 5.27
milliseconds and ECT increases with treatment level as expected. As the number of events
increases from 1,000 to 50,000, the design scales logarithmically caused mainly by MDT.
Event processing throughput is limited primarily by the message rate of the agent (40
messages/second). Additionally, the maximum effective consume rate for the controller
indicates this design is capable of supporting up to 380 hosts at one message per second.
Finally, every event initiated from all agents is successfully processed for both experiments
resulting in a 100% ESR.
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DYNAMIC NETWORK SECURITY CONTROL USING
SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING
I. Introduction
This research implements a system to propagate host-level security countermeasures to
switching devices using a host-based agent, Advanced Messaging Queuing Protocol (AMQP)
message broker, Software Defined Networking (SDN) controller (Floodlight), and an Open-
Flow enabled switch. This chapter introduces and provides context to the problem and the
approach to address it. Next, the goals and expected results are presented as a reference
point used to test the developed framework. Finally assumptions and limitations for this
research are explained.
1.1 Background
The Information Age brought great advances in efficiency, productivity, and convenience
in computing. Computing devices now support services spanning from basic utilities to mil-
itary defense systems. While the level of security required depends on the information or
resource being protected, host and network security is important to the success of most
organizations. One approach is to apply host and network-based security systems, which
typically come in the form of antivirus or intrusion detection/prevention products to man-
age these threats. However, since traditional networks require manual configuration, an
antivirus alert does nothing to protect other hosts using the same infrastructure from the
detected threat. A common reaction to detecting a malicious Internet Protocol (IP) address
is to block it at border devices. This approach, while somewhat effective is not appropriate
in all scenarios, especially those where services must be available.
Following the release of OpenFlow in 2007 [1], SDN enabled the separation of the con-
trol (configuration) and data (network traffic) planes reducing the requirement for manual
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configuration of network devices. OpenFlow enables network switching devices to be con-
figured though a controller. These controllers run custom applications created by program-
mers (e.g., Quality of Service, Security). Though some studies use network metadata to
affect network configuration [2, 3], none directly test event detection and notification (using
AMQP) on each host a to cause effects on the control plane.
1.2 Problem Statement
This research develops and implements a process to rapidly respond to host-level secu-
rity events by using SDN flow table updates, role-based flow classes, and AMQP to update
the configuration on switching devices and block malicious traffic. According to Symantec,
841 targeted attack campaigns were observed in 2014 [4]. Upon gaining access to a work-
station, the attacker traditionally attempts to move laterally to other hosts on the same
network. After establishing a foothold, the attacker finds a way to elevate privileges and
steal data. Preventing an attacker from pivoting from one host to another slows the attack
cycle and ultimately inhibits their capabilities. If an attacker gains access to fewer machines,
the number of compromised user accounts is limited, thereby reducing the amount of data
accessible by the attacker. Focusing on assessing if effective and efficient dynamic layer-
2 management is possible, this research uses role-based flow profiles and existing security
software to manage layer-2 flow tables. Ultimately, this research aims to address this prob-
lem and reduce the effectiveness of attackers by inhibiting their mobility and persistence
throughout a network.
1.3 Goals and Hypothesis
The objectives of this thesis are to develop and evaluate a process for managing network
traffic from hosts using an SDN controller and flowtable updates. The goal of this research
is to implement a system for near real time control of flow tables without inadvertently
denying critical communication channels. Thereby reducing the possibility of an unfavorable
outcome (e.g, loss of data). The components used are flow table updates to OpenFlow-
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enabled layer-2 devices, one modified Floodlight Stateless Firewall application, one AMQP
message broker and an agent at each host.
It is hypothesized that as the number of security incidents (events) sent to the controller
increase, the time to complete each event will increase but remain lower than one second,
the message delivery time will stay relatively static, and the event success rate will remain at
100%. By ensuring network flows are within the expected values and blocking or dropping
unexpected data at the switch, unauthorized data transmission can be stopped at the first
hop. The time interval of one second is used based on the assumption that the time required
for an attacker to gain access and steal data from a victim is greater than one second.
1.4 Approach
A network consisting of five nodes, one switch, one SDN controller, and one AMQP
message broker is deployed. Time is monitored throughout the process at the host agent,
message broker, and SDN application (before and after the event is complete). These time
measurements are used to calculate the total time it takes to deliver a message to the SDN
controller and to fully process each event.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
The experiments use some of the most common security events observed on the Air
Force Network (AFNet). The list of cases is compiled through coordination with the Air
Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT). This list includes malware de-
tected, unauthorized media detected, authentication failure, and registry modification or
tampering.
1.5.1 Security Event Detection.
Detecting a security event is not the focus of this research and is abstracted away to
the aforementioned event types randomly generated during each experiment. Research is
limited to how fast the system can make desired changes to configuration and the ease of
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adaptation to existing networks.
1.6 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the SDN body of research. Specific contributions include a
process for efficiently managing layer-2 flow table updates and programming the control
plane considering the security state of each end node.
1.7 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 defines security, SDN, and presents
relevant research needed to understand the proposed process being developed. Chapter 3
presents the approach to the problem, a detailed explanation of how each component works,
and key decisions during development. The methodology for evaluating the process using
SDN capabilities is covered in Chapter 4. The results for each experiment and analysis
of collected data are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the research
and concludes with an explanation of the significance of this research and suggested future
work.
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II. Background and Related Research
This chapter defines network and host security and discusses the traditional bodies of
research employed to secure a network. Section 2.1 introduces and defines the principles
of network and host-based security techniques and the concept of a holistic approach to
enterprise security. A thorough review of SDN technologies are presented by introducing
the control and data planes, OpenFlow, and SDN controllers in Section 2.2. In Section
2.3 reliable messaging is discussed, specifically the Open Internet standard AMQP. Section
2.4 introduces the principles of Role-based Access Control. This chapter concludes with a
description of research ideas used for this thesis in the context of a process to use SDN with
existing host and network security technologies.
2.1 Security Principles
Enterprise security concerns all devices from end hosts to intermediate switches and
routers. Traditional enterprise security is logically split into two classes, network and host
security. The network class includes security zones, access control, appliances such as a
firewall or Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and encrypted channels. Host or node based
security includes policy models implemented using access control, permissions, software
updates, and authentication schemes. Additional measures include registry or kernel moni-
toring and software such as antivirus, IDSs, or application security like Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) [5]. While it is outside the scope of this research to explain these classes in detail,
two observations are important to note. First, many different technologies have been de-
veloped in each of these two classes and in some cases exist in both (e.g., authentication
and intrusion detection). Second, few of these techniques propagate awareness (events) to
influence both classes concurrently. For example, many networks are customized with a se-
ries of devices to perform signature-based match-action events. Before SDN these systems
lacked the flexibility, control, and scalability necessary to manage complex networks in real
time without considerable equipment and resources. A secure network model includes the
following [6, 7]:
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• Access - those authorized can communicate to and from the network
• Confidentiality - information is protected while in transit
• Authentication - users are verified to be who they claim to be
• Integrity - the message being sent was not modified during transit
• Non-repudiation - each user can be decisively held accountable for their use of the
network
The following sections discuss the association of risk and security and the current tech-
nologies employed to maintain access, confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation.
2.1.1 Security and Risk.
Security is discussed by many as a risk management optimization problem; given all
feasible solutions, pick the best (least costly). A good example of this concept is the
software risk management framework. According to Dowling et al., Risk Exposure (R(E))
[8] is (1):
R(E) = P (OU)× L(OU) (1)
Where Probability of Unsatisfactory Outcome is P (OU) and Loss Given Unsatisfactory
Outcome is L(OU). This system depends on risk assessment and control to gather and
evaluate pertinent details to choose the best course of action. Naturally, decision makers
need to know as many relevant details as possible to make the best decision.
In the case of a computer network, a prime source of information is the end host. In
this approach, hosts are scanned at a set interval and system state is monitored. Unlike
many attempts at security, when leveraging SDN, change to security configuration does
not have to stop at the host. A goal of this research is to mitigate R(E) by presenting
a low cost network security framework that also lowers the probability of unsatisfactory
outcome. While network traffic is also a key source of security information, only host data
is considered in this research.
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2.1.2 Security Incidents.
Security incidents (with malicious intent), referred to as events in this research, occur
when an attacker with some objective uses tools to access unauthorized resources through a
discovered vulnerability by performing actions on targets [9]. Actions such as scan, bypass,
or steal may be focused on targets like a network, component (e.g., firewall), or data re-
spectively. This research focuses on responding to an event in the sense of an action focused
on a target. In Figure 1, Howard and Longstaff define an incident to contain one or more
attacks where each attack contains one or more events [9]. The events used in this research
are defined in this manner and classified in Table 1 in Section 3.3.1.1.
Figure 1. Security Incident Framework [9]
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2.1.3 Holistic Security Approach.
It is evident, especially in military organizations, a unit is only as secure as its weak-
est member. In the world of computing and networks, this means each device (and host)
must be protected. Many products attempt to protect a single device, such as an antivirus
suite, but this does not protect other hosts from being targeted from the same avenue of
attack. Other systems focus on detecting malicious network traffic using middle boxes like
an IDS or firewall. Neither solution is adequate to ensure a secure enterprise; however,
the combination of both can bolster security posture while reducing risk within the enter-
prise. The USAF currently uses a system known as Host Based Security System (HBSS)
which monitors, detects, and counters known cyber-threats [10]. HBSS is a Commercial
Off The Shelf (COTS) product based on McAfee’s Enterprise ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO)
suite and simplifies deployment of systems, security policies, and reduces infrastructure
overhead. ePO claims to synthesize global threat intelligence along with endpoint and net-
work security and compliance [10]. As attackers’ tactics, techniques, and procedures evolve,
holistic security technologies such as HBSS are a necessity to ensure access, confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation are safeguarded. While HBSS does reach all
devices across the enterprise, policy updates and system monitoring does not affect layer-2
switching rules. By coupling existing technologies such as HBSS, SDN, and AMQP, greater
network situational awareness and security are achievable.
2.1.4 Network-based Security.
Network-based security schemes aim to secure resources inside a protected network.
Networks are separated into physical and logical zones. These zones are commonly described
as public facing Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (internal unprotected) and private intranet
(internal protected) [5]. Within and on the edge of each zone, network appliances perform
filtering, forwarding, inspection, and accounting. Firewalls filter or forward traffic using
Access Control Lists (ACL) and a match-action operation. Inspection devices such as
an IDS or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) rely on signatures or anomaly detection to
8
determine if malicious traffic is present and in the case of the IPS, update rules or policies to
prevent said activity [11]. Unless tunneled through a secure channel like a Virtual Private
Network (VPN), secure data transfer is normally accomplished by applications on hosts
using SSL or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [5].
2.1.4.1 Switches and Routers.
Switches and routers forward information from one port or interface to another. Speed
is imperative to ensure data is transfered from source to destination as fast as possible.
These devices are managed by network administrators and do not keep record (logs) of
communications beyond hardware and network addresses [12]. This limitation is functional
since logging is computationally expensive and storage intensive. These devices process
traffic at near real time (microseconds) and with the exception of customized solutions are
not updated based on the changing state of end hosts. To achieve dynamic control of device
configuration and still maintain real time speed, this research leverages OpenFlow-capable
switches and the programmability of the network plane using SDN applications as described
in Section 2.2.
2.1.4.2 Network-based Detection and Prevention.
Figure 2 presents results from the annual Internet Security Threat Report published
by Symantec, where identification of zero day malware increased by 300% from 2011 to
2014 [4]. Network IDS/IPS are useful to identify malicious activity on hosts based on the
traffic they generate. The three main tools these systems provide to incident responders
is prevention, detection, and mitigation. These devices record incident information, notify
a human or system, and distill raw data into meaningful information for reporting [13].
The common detection methodologies include signature-based, anomaly-based, and stateful
protocol analysis and can be implemented in the network or host environment [14].
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Figure 2. Symantec Threat Report 2015 - Zero Day Statistics [4]
Signature detection systems are effective but do not reveal zero day exploits, especially
those encrypted and disguised as legitimate traffic. Comparing current activity to a defi-
nition of normal is the approach behind anomaly-based detection. Stateful analysis is also
effective but requires space, processing power, and time to implement. Because of these
requirements, stateful protocol analysis does not scale as well as signature based. Two open
source IDS solutions for signature and stateful protocol analysis are snort and Bro respec-
tively [15, 16]. Though the framework implemented in this research does not use a network
IDS, the flexible messaging system and status framework employed allows for integration
with any platform with system state information and Java, Python, or C/C++.
2.1.5 Host-based Security.
Host based IDS/IPS run as agents on a single host and monitor the state of a system
using various algorithms. Some of the characteristics monitored include network traffic, logs,
processes, files attributes, and system configuration [14]. The agent is highly customizable
and configured based on what it is designed to protect. One agent might be focused on
the Operating System (OS), while another focuses on application monitoring. If an alert is
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triggered, agents might communicate this information to a centralized server for reporting
or take action to secure the host immediately. Since most hosts use Java/Python/C++,
arguably any agent can be ported to the proposed framework using AMQP. A host-based
agent analogous to HBSS is used for this research and simulates events detected from
antivirus, access control, registry settings, or anomalies to determine the security state of
each host (Section 3.1). This implementation is similar to HBSS and can be applied by
the USAF if SDN-capable hardware and software are enabled/configured and HBSS agents
updated.
While HBSS agents can detect and intercept malicious attempts on the host, they do
not affect configuration change on network switching devices. This is because switching
hardware is designed to execute basic match-action instructions. Awareness of hosts is lim-
ited to a MAC address and physical port assignment unless additional rules are configured
such as a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN).
2.1.6 Role-based Access Control.
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is a non-discretionary security model. RBAC poses
access to objects as a user to member-of group relationship. This construct results in a set
of rules to govern access to objects based on a group’s function [17]. Flat RBAC is the
simplest implementation only requiring roles with a set of permissions and users assigned
roles [18, 19]. This research applies RBAC principles to create a flow table profile for each
role (workstation, server, etc.). Accordingly, each host on the network is assigned a role,
managed by an SDN application, and allowed to access other hosts (internal or external)
depending on the flow rules propagated using OpenFlow to switching devices. Section 3.1.2
explains the structure and function of the RBAC flow profile in detail.
2.2 Software Defined Networking
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is the use of software to manage packet forwarding
devices, essentially taking strict control of transmission and other flow functions away from
network devices. While this generalization seems simple, the application of SDN is far more
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dynamic and continues to evolve. This section explains why this field is so dynamic and
why allowing software to complement network flow control is so significant.
2.2.1 Network Control Evolution.
Computer networks traditionally rely on network switches, routers, and modems to
provide connectivity to other computers. Data from one computer to its destination is
managed by these devices and their employment of the transport and network interface
layers as described in the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) re-
quest for comments (RFC) 793 [20]. The use of match-action devices (e.g., switch) is still
the standard for packet forwarding in networking and is not changed by the development
of SDN. Commonly referred to as decoupling the data and control plane, SDN enables
software developers access to manage with particularity the previously inaccessible packet-
forwarding mechanism. As proposed in [21] an example of leveraging this capability is to
declare Quality of Service (QoS) requirements and for the underlying network to allocate
resources on demand. Using an application programming interface (API) the programmer
could signal the controller as bandwidth or response-time minimums are required, triggering
potential configuration changes issued by the controller to the underlying virtual or physical
switching infrastructure.
In 2007, a research team at Stanford University envisioned a network without the limita-
tions of traditional hardware switching technologies. As computing and networks continue
to grow, network infrastructure must scale to handle the load. In an effort to facilitate
research and curb the cost of equipment and management, Martin Casado developed the
modern concept of SDN and the open-source southbound API OpenFlow [1, 22]. The efforts
of his team led to what is known as SDN.
2.2.2 The Control and Data Planes.
The purpose behind developing SDN was to make a traditionally rigid environment (a
network) more flexible. In [22] Casado et al. describes the ideal “control plane” (layer)
as being flexible, simple, inexpensive and vendor neutral. They also imply the ideal “data
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plane” as including intelligent devices with virtual switching features built-in. It is hard to
imagine a traditional network that meets any of these goals. In efforts to reach these goals,
network devices and vendors thereof, must surrender proprietary control and just transfer
data, leaving the management of traffic to a software controller. Figure 3 illustrates how the
infrastructure for a network becomes two pronged, (i) physical hardware and (ii) software
that controls it–hence the data and control layers [23]. The application layer is the final
piece to the puzzle, where programmers use an API to interact with the control layer. In




Figure 3. SDN Framework [23]
Between the application and control layers, developers are empowered with an API
known as the Northbound API. This is where the control plane is affected by the appli-
cation (or user), enabling calls to the control layer where the SDN control software or
“Controller” is located. There, the controller provides network functions such as routing
and security. Below the control layer is the infrastructure layer, where physical and vir-
tual network devices reside. Network devices (e.g., switch) supporting OpenFlow reside at
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the infrastructure layer and represent the data plane. This is where the control and data
plane interface and the OpenFlow protocol is used to control devices. Presently no industry
standard exists for SDN controllers, however, BigSwitch Networks and VMWare developed
one vendor-agnostic API named Quantum that is employed in the OpenStack cloud service
framework [24, 25].
2.2.3 Virtual Switching.
Virtual switching refers to delivering network traffic from one host to another (possibly
without leaving the host operating system) using software or a combination of hardware
and software. Without the proliferation of Virtual Machines (VMs) and affordable cloud
computing solutions, SDN would arguably not be as popular as it is today. As hardware
becomes more robust and software is developed to take advantage of these systems, a few
high-performance servers might replace what was previously tens (eventually hundreds) of
servers. With free software enabling virtualization like Oracles VirtualBox, using VMs on
individual workstations is common place, especially in academia and research and develop-
ment.
With virtual machines came the issue of network access. In early VMs, bridging virtual
network devices to physical devices was common. As hardware and software advanced,
whole networks could exist within a single physical machine. For example, Linux releases
since 3.3 are vSwitch compatible and work seamlessly with VMWare and VirtualBox [26].
There are several virtual switching technologies such as Open vSwitch (OVS) [26], OpenFlow
[22], Cisco Nexus 5000V [27], and IBM 5000V [28].
2.2.4 OpenFlow.
The Open Networking Foundation (ONF) is a non-profit open-source community charged
with developing and accelerating the adoption of SDN [29]. ONF has a membership of over
100 companies with more than 64 OpenFlow products on the market. Since 2009, ONF
released four major revisions to OpenFlow and the latest proposed specification (OpenFlow
1.5) was released in December of 2014. OpenFlow is the first official southbound API for
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SDN to provide device management and configuration across several vendors. An Open-
Flow switch consists of three main components–flow tables, a group table, and a channel.
The channel is used to manage and communicate between an SDN controller and a switch.
While the group and flow tables contain match-action rules (e.g., match: IP address p,
action: forward to port q). As seen in Figure 4, as each flow is processed through the flow
table pipeline, it is either matched or passed to the next table. If no match is found, the
flow is processed with the configured default rule (e.g., forward, drop, or flood).
Figure 4. Components of an OpenFlow Switch [23]
The divergence from traditional switching is evident as there is a controller exterior to
the switch managing flow tables. In traditional switching, flow rules are statically set by
an administrator. Changing rules requires authenticating, loading, modifying, and saving
the configuration–all introducing time, personnel cost, and potential human error. Pure
SDN and hybrid switches working in OpenFlow mode process flows using the OpenFlow
pipeline. This pipeline implies each packet is processed by each flow table and passed to
the next if not matched. Each flow table is numbered starting at zero and increasing. As
shown in Figure 5, if the flow table matches the packet, the instructions for that flow table
are executed.
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Figure 5. OpenFlow packet flow through the processing pipeline [23]
2.2.5 SDN Controllers and Programability.
Programming on the control plane, while being a new practice, was not a new concept
when the Stanford team began building the OpenFlow standard. Starting in 1995, those
devoted to the potential usefulness of a programmable network interface (or network API),
first developed Active Networks and Control-Data Separation. By 2007 NOX/POX (the
first OF controller) was released to the public and provided a much desired leap forward
for SDN research [30, 31]. Given virtual switching and how the control and data plane
are decoupled using SDN, the following sections describe the controller, their potential
impact on a network, and popular publicly-available controllers–NOX, Floodlight, and Ryu
(ree-you).
An SDN controller at the core is a software approach to manage network resources and
provide an interface between network traffic and applications. For example, a custom ap-
plication to handle layer-2 switching, could monitor and meter types of flows for accounting
or security purposes. Any middle box solution such as IDS, firewall, or even network ser-
vices like Domain Name Service (DNS) can be implemented as an application on top of
a controller. Management of functions provided by traditional infrastructure is abstracted
away to control software (applications).
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2.2.6 Beacon and Floodlight.
Following NOX/POX, the next leap forward was the release of the Java based open
source controller Beacon. Being integrated into the well known open source IDE Eclipse,
made SDN applications available to any programmer from beginner to skilled professional.
As a fork of the Beacon source, Big Switch Networks created their own version titled
Floodlight. Built using the popular Apache Ant framework, Floodlight became even more
accessible and fostered a very active community of SDN developers [32]. Figure 6 shows
the Floodlight framework is structured so modular applications access core services through
the Java API. The programmer has the freedom to innovate by developing modules (ap-
plications) such as forwarding, firewall, or learning switch. All of which is accessible using
REST applications through the REST API.
Figure 6. Floodlight Controller Framework [32]
Floodlight is used by a number of projects to enable virtual network and machine
management. One of the flexible features of Floodlight is a Representational State Transfer
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(REST) API which allows access to both applications and controller modules. One of the
most popular open source projects to use Floodlight is OpenStack. Using the OpenStack
Horizon GUI, virtual networks are managed along side VMs using the Floodlight REST
API [33].
2.3 SDN Security Concerns
As with any new technology, inherent vulnerabilities exist. For SDN, the controller
and the OpenFlow protocol are two new targets introduced into the traditional network
environment. This leads attackers to target the controller mainly through spoofing, flooding,
and modifying. Scott-Hayward et al. present one of the most comprehensive reviews of SDN
security issues across the application, control, and data layers [34]. With SDN, the controller
applies rules and takes action depending on flow tables and logic, while the attacker aims to
disrupt the control or action process by manipulating the controller. Controllers are most
commonly targeted using unauthorized access, data-leakage, data-modification and denial
of service attacks [34].
In [35], Kloti et al. apply the Microsoft STRIDE framework to assess data leakage
and denial of service impact on SDN. Using Mininet and Open vSwitch for a simulated
environment and scapy [36] for traffic generation, the authors established flow rules can be
discovered by comparing response time of the TCP setup for adding an OpenFlow flow rule.
The attacker can potentially learn about network services and hosts without performing a
scan. While this attack is mitigated by enabling TLS, OpenFlow does not require this
feature.
2.3.1 Applications.
When network control plane programmability was presented to the developer, services
previously implemented on middle-boxes were integrated with the controller as applications
(or modules). With an unified view and control of network flows, real time configuration
allows for unprecedented access to control network traffic. This network-wide view enables
algorithms designed to detect, predict, or block malicious traffic at the first sign of untrusted
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connections. Although possibilities are bounded only by the imagination of programmers,
there are limits to what can be accomplished without impacting network services.
2.4 Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
Since devices are not inherently compatible, events with enterprise-wide implications
require coordination. Moreover the optimal messaging system must be OS independent,
reliable and secure. With advancement in cloud computing and financial advantage of
a distributed architecture, a message-oriented middleware is a viable approach. In 2003,
O’Hara introduced an open source messaging protocol with the goal of interconnecting any
business system using a broker [37]. Each client can register and communicate using a queue
managed by the broker. Following open source development, ISO/IEC 19464-AMQP was
released in 2007 [37]. AMQP is a wire-level protocol similar to hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP). Unlike HTTP, AMQP is a binary protocol (intended to be read by machines and
not people) and provides reliable queuing, topic based publish-and-subscribe messaging,
flexible routing, transactions, and security [38]. These features make AMQP ideal for large
scale clusters that require messaging for coordination. Many organizations have adopted
AMQP [39]:
• JPMorgan processes 1 billion AMQP messages per day in critical systems.
• NASA uses AMQP for control plane on the Nebula Cloud Computing project.
• Google project Rocksteady uses AMQP to analyze user defined metrics.
AMQP adheres to industry standards for data framing, client-server negotiation and
connection handling. Binary protocols are more efficient as they allow more to be sent in
each frame verses sending text across the wire [40]. At the application layer, basic command
classes exist for session management such as Basic.Publish for sending, Basic.Get for
consuming and Basic.Ack for acknowledgment of a message [39]. One of the most significant
features of AMQP is the community-driven libraries available in Java, C++, Python, Ada,
and Ruby. Figure 7 illustrates a multi-language OS-independent topology of messaging
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with AMQP where each agent can communicate through the broker within the server.
With such comprehensive coverage, any modern system with support from at least one of
the aforementioned languages can use AMQP. As a result of the powerful features provided
by AMQP, developers press for native support across all modern OS distributions.
Python Agent
AMQP Server
Ada Agent Java Agent C/C++ Agent
Broker
Figure 7. Advanced Messaging Queuing Protocol Language Support
2.4.1 Brokers: Exchanges and Queues.
AMQP uses a modular approach to separate message delivery and storage. Exchanges
are the first container used to deliver messages to queues. Each exchange is named and
consists of a set of rules to determine where to deliver each inbound message, which is
accomplished using a routing key. Messages are stored in the keyed container awaiting
a consumer. Queues are the storage location (memory or disk) where messages are held
during transmission from one host to another. AMQP uses a series of queues, at least four
per queue instance. Each message is in at least one of the four internal queues depending
on the state of the message. For example a message might be in memory or on disk, each
stored as a unique internal sub queue.
Figure 8 illustrates the topic exchange configuration used in this research. P1-P5 repre-
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sent the hosts (producers), each with an agent sending messages (events) to the broker. At
the exchange, depending on the routing key, messages are placed in the appropriate queue–
in this case SecurityState. C1 is the consumer (module within the controller) retrieving









Figure 8. AMQP Topic Broker Example
2.4.2 RabbitMQ.
RabbitMQ is a highly customizable and widely adopted implementation of AMQP. Key
features include node-clustering, highly available queues, multi-protocol support, message
tracing/tracking and a plug-in system [41]. RabbitMQ supplies a management UI for mon-
itoring and control of the message broker. AMQP libraries for most languages are freely
available through open source projects; the one selected for this research is the Python
library pika [42]. A test scenario with a single-host three node cluster (three Erlang nodes
running RabbitMQ) with 10 publishers and 10 consumers (both remote from broker) re-
sulted a publish rate of 33.3K messages per second and a consume rate of 16.2K msg./sec.
[43]. RabbitMQ is used for this research because it is open source, widely adopted by
industry leaders across multiple disciplines (Google, NASA, JP Morgan), provides secure
messaging, logging, and tracking, and is capable of millisecond end-to-end message delivery.
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2.5 Dynamic Security Control Using SDN
Dynamic Security Control Using SDN (DSCS) has five components (Figure 9):
1. Host agent detection and updates (Section 2.1.4)
2. Reliable host to SDN controller messaging using AMQP (Section 2.3)
3. SDN controller with DSCS module (Section 2.2.5)
4. Role-based flow profile (Section 2.1.5)
5. Flow table updates from controllers to switch (Section 2.2.2)
Host Agent Detection
- Existing software
- Sends Notices  
SDN Controller
- Management App
- Flow table updates











Figure 9. Dynamic Security Control Using SDN Process
Dynamic or automated network security strives to preemptively adjust policies to prevent
the unknown. That is, the next zero-day or exploit without a signature. While advanced
antivirus software is capable of identifying and taking action on hosts, little is done to adjust
the logical topography (flow tables) of the network. Assuming each host is unaware of the
security status of other hosts, the rest of the hosts within the enterprise are still vulnerable
to the attack and all communication to and from the compromised host are allowed to
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continue. Figure 9 shows how each host provides security event data to the controller and
updates are applied to the network. It is important to note this model is not specific to
any single product but a process employed using the aforementioned types of technology.
Floodlight is selected for this research because it is a popular and community-supported
controller platform. However, DSCS can be implemented with any platform capable of flow
table updates, custom applications, and the AMQP library.
2.5.1 Related Research.
One similar proof of concept project, Active Security, implements a network IDS that
communicates with the SDN controller to trigger an agent to take action on the host. The
host collects an image of memory (RAM) and sends it to a forensics server for process-
ing. If malicious connections are detected, the forensic server communicates with the SDN
controller to block those outbound connections. This process is focused on network IDS
triggering and blocking malicious connections for the specific host [2].
While this approach is effective it fails to manage the continuum of security events
(Section 3.1.3). Low confidence security events might not require memory collection and
blocking, but are important to the overall security state of each host. This research proposes
a more general approach to handle security level changes that might not warrant out right
blocking. From routine to major security incidents, the state of each host is monitored
through agent-controller updates. Unlike Active Security, DSCS uses secure messaging
(AMQP SSL) between host and controller.
2.5.2 Chapter Summary.
This chapter introduces security principles, software defined networks, and messaging
using AMQP to support the implementation of the DSCS framework. Additionally, how




This chapter provides a detailed description of the component parts used to implement
the DSCS system. In order to achieve the goals of efficient, effective, and ease of imple-
mentation, each component is developed using open source software and tools vetted by
industry leaders in networking and security. After considering the technologies previously
discussed, the four components for the DSCS system include an agent, role-based flow pro-
files, a broker, and an SDN controller (Figure 9). The role-based flow profile (Section 3.4) is
a novel contribution that enables host-level customization of access based on communication
requirements and profile (workstation, server, etc). Additionally, the use of a security index
representing the trustworthiness of each host is unique. The following sections describe in
detail the agent, role-based flow profile, AMQP messaging, and Floodlight controller.
3.2 Design Parameters
The following design parameters are considered while developing the DSCS framework:
Efficiency
1. Modifies network flow at layer-2 in less than 1 second.
2. Only malicious network connections are blocked, not critical services.
3. Automated detection, reporting, and response using flow table updates.
Effectiveness
1. Every security event triggered is processed without fail.
2. Routes to critical hosts are maintained and blocked automatically.
3. Malicious outbound connections are blocked at layer-2.
Ease of Implementation
1. Agents interface with existing security software (e.g., antivirus, HBSS).
2. System (Controller and Broker) do not require high performance computers.
3. Compatible with existing host-based security systems.
24
3.3 DSCS Design
This section provides a high-level description of how the DSCS system is designed to
operate. Agents interface with existing security software like antivirus on the host using a
custom Python interface created by the developer (e.g., Symantec’s API is Symantec Scan
Engine 5.2 [44]). Within the interface, each class of security event provided by the API is
defined and assigned a message type and action (e.g., malware: block, registry: block, au-
thentication: notify). Following the example illustrated in Figure 10, Agent 1 is configured
to interface with the Symantec Scan API running on the host and infected with malware.
Since malware detection triggers an event to send an update to the controller indicating
the host is no longer trusted, a message is sent to the AMQP Broker RabbitMQ (orange
lines). The controller is continuously checking for new messages (blue lines) and consumes
the message upon delivery. The message (event) is processed by the SDN Controller DSCS
Module and pushes a flow table update to all connected switches to block traffic from Agent




















Figure 10. DSCS System Design
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3.4 Host Agent
The host agent is implemented as a system of Python scripts (version 2.7.2), Java, virtual
machines, and a virtual switch. To test the robustness and scalability of this system, real
world security events are simulated. The agent operates under the following assumptions
and limitations. First the host is running a host-based security system with an accessible
API–this feature is simulated during testing. Second, since the agent sends AMQP messages
through the broker, sufficient rights and permissions to query and use network devices are
required. Next, the host security system can identify and report malicious connections as an
(IP PORT) pair using a loaded module, in this case ModSysStatus (Section 3.3.3). Finally,
during install the agent is configured by an administrator who specifies values for critical
routes, a confidence value for each alert type (malware, registry, authentication, etc.), and
a profile type (Section 3.4.2).
Figure 11 models the states within the host agent program. The initial state S0 identifies
the start of the code. After setup, S1 is the core of the code where events are detected and
a message is constructed and sent to the controller via the broker. Appendix A provides a




Figure 11. Agent State Model
The agent is comprised of a main subroutine and set of loaded modules. In Figure 12,
each module provides custom functionality based on the purpose of the application, in this
case managing the control plane of the network using ModSysStatus.py. Another example
is a module to perform incident response actions upon security status change, e.g., capture
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memory or other volatile data. The modular design of this agent allows for it to attach to









Event - Message - ModSysStatus Relationship
Figure 12. Agent Design Model
3.4.1 Security Event Detection.
The simulated security event types built into this system are provided through coordi-
nation with 24 Air Force and reflect four top event classes detected on the AFNet. These
event types exist in all environments but may vary based on organizational requirements.
However, each event does span any infrastructure running Windows based operating sys-
tems. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, an event is comprised of an action and a target. During
testing, events are generated with a confidence setting from zero to one based on the ad-
ministrators trust in the signature. The confidence setting is used to determine if a blocking
rule should be implemented. The SDN module is configured to take action based on the
event type and confidence setting. This model allows for tracking the overall security state
at a host based on events or event clusters (e.g., series or groups of events). Section 3.6.2.1
provides detail on how the SDN module manages this process.
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3.4.1.1 Event Generation.
Events are generated by the test suite and consist of four state variables. The first
is a binary decision if the event will fire or not (fireEvt 0 or 1). The second consists
of four levels (evtTyp 0 - 3) representing the events described in Table 1 as (0:Malware,
1:Unauthorized Media, 2:Authentication, 3:Registry). Next, to simulate real-world
delay in events, a delay of zero to two seconds (evtDly 0.00 - 2.00) is applied at each iteration
per host. However, since the purpose of this research is to test how the system responds
under a greater number of events per second, a delay of zero is used for all tests. Finally,
a confidence value originally set by the network administrator is attached to the event
(evtCon 0.00 - 0.20). Each event is assigned a confidence value to represent the network
administrators trust in the detection method triggering the event. If the event warrants
a block to occur, the confidence is set 1.00 (e.g., malware detected). While events with
lower severity might only receive 0.10 (e.g., unauthorized media access). Since events are
randomly generated only those not causing a block event use evtCon. For example, if the
detection system is highly targeted to a specific malware activity the confidence setting
might be 1, but if the event is only a small indicator of possible malicious traffic, the setting
might be 0.01. Even the smallest event type is significant when considering the overall
security state for a host. If the event does trigger, the event type flag is set, a confidence
value is generated and a message is sent to the AMQP broker where it is stored until being
consumed by the controller.
3.4.2 Message Data Structure (Message.py).
This module facilitates communication with the SDN controller. The Message class
produces a Javascript String Object Notation (JSON) object with information required
by the controller for processing events. Fields for the message structure include msgtype,
hostID, MAC, IP, msgData, and updates[] (an array of objects). The message object is
designed to provide information to block or allow flows, though any structure could be
passed to the controller for processing. In Figure 13, msgData contains the command being
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Table 1. Security Events
Event Action/Target Flow table update
Malware: Virus scanner or
other signature based de-
vice identifies malware on the
host.
Action: Bypass, Modify, Authenticate
Target: Account, Process, Component,
Computer, Network
Yes (critical hosts
only & notify security
officer)
Unauthorized Media: User
attaches external media or
burns a CD/DVD
Action: Bypass, Read, Copy, Steal
Target: Data
Yes (Block out bound










officer & revoke ac-
count)
Registry: Targeted/criti-
cal areas of windows reg-
istry is modified.
Action: Modify, Authenticate, Bypass




sent “modify” and the updates[] object contains two rules to apply–allow 10.0.0.3 and
10.0.0.4 to communicate. Upon consuming this message (event), the controller takes action
if the host is trusted and allowed to make this modification (based on flow profile assigned).
3.4.2.1 AMQP libary pika.
To facilitate AMQP communication to the agent, pika [42] is used to manage the connec-
tion with the AMQP broker. The components used by pika include credentials, connection
parameters, channel management, and sending/receiving messages (basic publish). Creden-
tials to authenticate with the broker depend on a username and password. The encrypted
credentials are passed during connection negotiation but are stored in plaintext in the agent
configuration files. For this implementation, the username is clientN , where N represents a
number from 0 - 9, and the password is 12 characters randomly generated using the Linux
program APG [45]. The connection parameters are specified within the agent to specify
host, port, virtual host, credentials, and SSL (shown below).
s e l f . parameters = pika . ConnectionParameters ( ’ 1 0 . 1 . 0 . 1 7 9 ’ , 5671 ,
’ / ’ , p ika . P l a i nC re de n t i a l s ( ’ c l i e n t 1 ’ , ’ EJ1j0Ir Iy3b$ ’ ) , True )
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Figure 13. DSCS JSON Message Structure
Connection parameters may also be presented as a URLParameter in the form:
amqp://client:client@localhost:5672/%2F, known as the AMQP URL.
As an event fires, a secure connection (SSL) is established with the broker using the
aforementioned credentials, connection parameters, and channel options specified within
the message module. After a connection is established, the channel object declares the
exchange, routing key, and message body. Delivery confirmation is set to ensure all security
related messages are not lost in transit and reach the broker.
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3.4.3 System Status (ModSysStatus.py).
This module runs on the host and acts as an extension to the SDN application run-
ning on the controller. In a production environment, this module is multi-threaded and
interfaces with host-based security software to generate system security status updates to
the controller. As detection is not the purpose of this research, ModSysStatus uses the
DSCSTest module to simulate security events.
3.4.4 DSCS Test Suite (DSCSTest.py).
This module is the primary portion of logic for the agent during testing, responsible
for executing tests and collecting performance data for the host. As described in Section
3.3.1.1, fireEvt, evtType, evtDly, and evtCon are randomly generated to account for event
variability expected to occur during a real world implementation. When initialized within
the ModSysStatus module, DSCSTest requires the agent (object Agent.py), a sample size,
and number of runs as parameters. During testing the doRuns() method is executed where
the firewall is enabled and the host is registered with the controller as a node in the network.
Each host is uniquely identified by generating an MD5 hash of the hostname concatenated
with the MAC address. Table 2 shows the structure for message commands used by the
agent.
3.5 Role-Based Flow Profile
Using the principle of RBAC, where each subject is assigned a role, hosts register with
the controller using registerAgent() and specify a profile type. The general profiles supported
are server and workstation. Profiles are unique based on initial rules installed, static routes
maintained, and how the node is treated during a critical security event. Applying roles to a
network and flow enforcement policy allows for the controller to maintain state information
about each host registered. This implementation of DSCS tracks security status of each host
by maintaining a security index for each host. The index is updated as sendSecUpdate() is
executed by the agent. This index represents the security risk associated to the host–higher
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Table 2. Message Structure
Function Structure
initFirewall() {”msgType”: ”setup”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”msgData”: {”command”: ”toggle”}}
registerAgent() {”msgType”: ”setup”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”profile”:”workstation”}
sendPollUpdate() {”msgType”: ”polling”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”:”10.1.0.59”}
sendUpdate() {”msgType”: ”event”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”msgData”: {”command”: ”modify”}, ”updates”:
[{”src-ip”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”dst-ip”: ”0.0.0.0”, ”priority”:10,
”action”:”DENY”, ”conf”:1}]}
sendSecUpdate() {”msgType”: ”event”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”msgData”: {”command”: ”sec-update”},
”updates”: [{”conf”:0.182324745426}]}
sendDelete() {”msgType”: ”event”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”, ”MAC”: ”2c:44:fd:66:2b:c2”,
”IP”: ”10.1.0.59”, ”msgData”: {”command”: ”delete”, ”arg0”:”123”},
”updates”: []}
purgeData() {”msgType”: ”purgeData”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”}
sendSyncData() {”msgType”: ”syncData”, ”hostID”: ”xyz”,
”data”: [{”id”:”0.999927520752”},{”val”:”1.00016593933”}, ... ,
{”val”:”0.999927520752”}]}
index implies higher risk.
3.5.1 Managing False Positives.
Dealing with false positive alerts is a significant challenge for automated security sys-
tems. To avoid denial of service to hosts with many low confidence events, blocking only
occurs when confidence reaches a certain threshold determined by the network administra-
tor during installation. This occurs as the DSCS module within the controller maintains a
security index for each node registered. While many low confidence events may raise the
node security index above an acceptable limit, the node will still maintain access to resources
unless administrative action is taken. This approach highlights hosts that are a potential
risk based on the activity reported by the agent before blocking all communications.
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3.5.1.1 Server.
The server profile is focused on being available even if the host is compromised. This
is achieved by identifying critical routes and white-listing core systems by IP:PORT com-
bination or MAC address. Servers are not expected to establish outbound connections to
unknown hosts or connect to hosts within the same network without white-listing. The
most unique feature for the server role is based on providing services even if the underlying
server is compromised. This is accomplished by not blocking inbound connection requests
on published services unless a critical stop is triggered. In the interest of not denying ser-
vice based on false positives, this system allows a compromised system to provide critical
services such as authentication or electronic mail.
3.5.1.2 Workstation.
Workstations are expected to be able communicate with anywhere on the public Internet.
This limits outbound blocking on common ports such as 80 or 443. This is a key reason
why attackers use reverse connection techniques to avoid detection during an attack. Unlike
the server profile, if a high confidence modification with a DENY update is triggered the
workstation will be blocked from accessing the remote address. If the event is critical, access
to external and non-server hosts are blocked as well.
3.6 AMQP Messaging
The second component in the DSCS process is secure reliable messaging. Using AMQP
with SSL enabled through the pika library (Section 3.3.2.1) each node within the network
has a secure channel to pass messages to the SDN controller through a RabbitMQ message
broker. On the broker, an exchange containing message queues facilitates the delivery of
messages from each agent to the SDN application. This method is reliable because AMQP
facilitates delivery confirmation and tracking of each message to ensure fidelity. DSCS
employs a publisher-consumer model where many nodes publish to the same queue with a
common routing key and a single consumer, the SDN controller, processes the messages as
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they become available. Figure 14 illustrates the states within the AMQP broker RabbitMQ.
S0 represents the initialization of the program. As a message is sent or received, S2 and





Receive MessageV alid / Invalid
Send MessageV alid / Invalid
Figure 14. Broker State Model
3.6.1 Broker, Channel, Exchange, Queue.
The broker functions similarly to a mail collector responsible for managing exchanges
(mail room) and queues (mail boxes) organized within containers called virtual hosts (post
offices). The default virtual host is ‘/’, and can be considered a set of databases (exchanges
or mail rooms). The broker used in this implementation is RabbitMQ 3.5.4 Erlang 18.0
[41]. A secure TCP channel is negotiated between each host and the broker. The two
channel commands used in this implementation are confirm delivery() and basic publish().
The first used to verify message receipt and the second to publish a message to the broker
specified in the channels connection parameters. Before a message is sent to the broker,
it must be addressed to a recipient. Using a publisher-consumer model, the parameters
are set on the client in the pika.ConnectionParameters and channel.basic publish objects.
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The type of exchange used for the DSCS system is a topic exchange, which is optimal for
delivery to one or many queues. Queues are the resting place for messages in transit and are
persistent in the broker. This means any message that arrives in a durable queue will not
be lost if the broker crashes or the service is restarted. For this reason, the DSCS queue is
configured as durable and non exclusive-available to many connections and does not delete
after disconnect.
3.7 Floodlight Controller
While there are many SDN controllers with modular application development support,
Floodlight is used because it is a Java-based implementation with open source libraries to
AMQP, RabbitMQ, network socket programming, and RESTful application support. Flood-
light version 1.1 is extended to develop a network security service to track the security status,
using a security index (configured within the Network.java class as SEC IND LIMIT), of
the nodes connected to an SDN managed switch. The service provided by DSCS is im-
plemented as a module running on top of the core SDN controller and uses the Stateless
Firewall developed by Tahir, Wang, and Izard of Big Switch Networks [46]. Figure 15 pro-
vides a general Unified Modeling Language (UML) representation of the classes created to
extend the Stateless Firewall.
Figure 15. DSCS Java Implementation UML
3.7.1 Developed Components.
The Floodlight Firewall application is modified to initialize a multi-threaded MsgBro-
ker.class. MsgBroker enables the firewall to accomplish three new services. First a represen-
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tation of the network is maintained in a network object (Network.class), containing nodes
and links. This object is maintained by the MsgBroker and provides real-time security
status for all nodes registered. Next, a channel to the message broker is established for con-
suming messages from agents located on each host. This channel is implemented using the
com.rabbitmq.client library [47]. If messages are pending delivery on startup, they are pro-
cessed after the firewall module is initiated and not lost. Finally, the ControllerREST.class
allows for modification of firewall rules using the existing REST interface provided by the
Firewall module. With these three services, the existing Firewall.class is able to maintain
a security state on all nodes in the network.
Figure 16 models the states within the Floodlight controller application DSCS. As mes-
sages are consumed from the broker, the MsgBroker class updates the network map (Net-
work class) and individual node security status (Node class) while also managing the channel
between controller and broker (RabbitMQ library). S0 represents the start of the DSCS
application followed immediately by entering state S1. S2 signifies the use of the Controller-
REST class to update flow tables on connected switches. S1 is entered after processing each
event. Appendix A presents a full inter-component state digram.
S1S0 S2
Message
Process / Return to Scan
No Message
Figure 16. Controller DSCS State Model
Msg.class. As MsgBroker consumes a message from the broker, the payload is
parsed using the Msg class. MsgType, hostID, MAC, and IP hold the identifying data
used when processing the message after parsing. Two hash maps, msgData and updates,
hold the event details to update the network and if required, firewall rules. The msgData
map contains commands and any arguments required e.g., command: modify, sec-update,
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toggle. Command-type modify indicates the updates object has entries to be considered for
application to the firewall. While sec-update indicates an event to modify the security index
occurred. Finally, the toggle command is used to enable the firewall during setup.
3.7.1.1 MsgBroker.class.
As shown in Figure 17, the MsgBroker class contains components to maintain a net-
work map, interface with the AMQP broker, and execute changes to the SDN controller
using the RESTful Firewall interface.The network (Network) object represents a map of
nodes registered through an agent on the network. All registered nodes are in the same
network and data is not shared between controllers in this implementation. Controller-
REST enables communication with the Firewall REST application and is described in the
next section. The static final variables (QUEUE NAME, ROUTING KEY, EXCHANGE,
EXCHANGE TYPE, DURABLE, USER, PASS, HOSTNAME) are for the configuration of
the AMQP broker. The checkNodes variable is a boolean value indicating if nodes should
be checked periodically (default TRUE).
3.7.1.2 ControllerREST.class.
Table 3 presents the commands used in this implementation [48]. Figure 17 illustrates
the structure of the ControllerREST class. Depending on the method called, the POST,
PUT, GET, or DELETE strings are used to issue a REST command to the Stateless Firewall
module. The data string holds the command being sent to the controller when a POST or
GET method is executed.
In order to update the firewall rules applied as flow table rules on each switch, this class
provides methods to execute REST commands. Since the Floodlight Stateless Firewall
is a RESTful application, this class acts as an interface to mange the underlying storage
source table containing firewall rules (net.floodlightcontroller.storage). As the source table
is updated, modifications are pushed to all connected switches. Depending on the command
and action sent from each host agent, the sendPost(), sendPut(), or sendDelete() commands
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Table 3. Floodlight Stateless Firewall RESTful API
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Method Description
/wm/firewall/module/status/json GET Firewall Status (enabled/disabled)
/wm/firewall/module/enable/json PUT Enable firewall
/wm/firewall/rules/json PUT Disable Firewall
/wm/firewall/rules/json GET List all rules installed
/wm/firewall/rules/json POST Create new rule
Sent using HttpURLConnection (java.net.HttpURLConnection) with URI and method.
are executed to manage the Firewall configuration. The data string is the payload sent
during a POST or PUT method. For example, as a modify command is issued, data is set
to a JSON string object like seen in sendUpdate() in Table 2 and a POST command is sent
to the URI /wm/firewall/rules/json.
3.7.1.3 Network.class.
The Network class maintains a real-time representation of the network by documenting
the unique hosts registered and their associated security index. Upon registering, a Node
object is created and added to the nodes list. During the checkSecurity() method, the
security index for every node is compared to SEC IND LIMIT which is set by the network
administrator. If the index value exceeds SEC IND LIMIT the host is flagged as no longer
trusted. In a real-world implementation, since the security index increases as events occur
on each host, an acceptable index limit must be determined based on the hosts unique
configuration. Figure 17 provides a UML description of objects and functions of the Network
class.
Depending on the profile set during agent configuration (e.g., workstation, server), the
staticLinks structure holds a hash map of IP addresses keyed by the hostID. This structure
allows for a representation of the network configuration for reference when making changes
to the firewall. If the IP is added to this list, it should not be blocked irrespective of the
hosts security status. This feature allows mission critical resources to be available even
during security events that otherwise would stop all communications.
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Figure 17. UML Definition of Developed DSCS Module
Node.class. The Node class represents a registered host in the network. A node
consists of a hostID, IP address, MAC address, security index, a list of allows and blocks,
and pollTime (the last time the node checked in). Four objects are used to keep track
of time for each specific event. MsgDeliverAgentLog records the elapsed time to deliver
the event message from agent to broker. ConsumerDataLog records the elapsed time to
consume a message event from the message broker. EventCompleteTimeLog records the
time required to send an update to the firewall and then be applied to the switch. Finally,
EventSuccessLog records if the action sent to the controller was completed or not. These
four pieces of data are used to determine the metrics for the DSCS system during each trial.
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3.8 Design Summary
In summary this chapter describes the DSCS process and design. The framework is
designed to be efficient, effective, and easy to implement. This design is a novel approach
at automating firewall rules applied at layer-2 using a Floodlight stateless firewall, an AMQP
message broker, and security events sent by an agent on individual nodes.
The features unique to DSCS include:
• dynamic updates to layer-2 flow tables
• node security index tracking at controller
• role-based flow profiles to ensure mission critical hosts are reachable
Initial pilot tests produced a mean of 24 milliseconds from the event triggering to flow
table update. The test environment included two hosts, one AMQP broker, one SDN
controller, and one virtual switch.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Problem Statement and Goals
This research focuses on a process to rapidly respond to host-level security events by
using SDN flow table updates, role-based flow classes, and AMQP messaging. Aimed at
assessing if effective dynamic layer-2 management is possible, role-based flow profiles and
existing security software modifies layer-2 flow rules using an SDN controller application.
The goals in testing this implementation stem from those stated in Section 3.2. For
each, the following questions are important:
Efficiency.
• Can a network flow be blocked automatically in less than 1 second of a security event
firing from a host?
• How does the DSCS system respond as the number of events increase? (e.g., mean
time for flow table updates)
Effectiveness.
• Is every event sent to the broker processed?
• Are routes to critical infrastructure maintained after flow tables updates are made?
• Are firewall rules to block or allow traffic effective at layer-2?
Ease of Implementation.
• Is the process OS independent?
• Does the system require more configuration than existing security solutions?
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4.2 Approach
The DSCS framework notifies network control devices of security events occurring on
hosts. Events are sent using an AMQP message broker and consumed by an SDN controller
application where flow table updates are issued using OpenFlow. See Chapter 3 for a
detailed explanation of DSCS.
To test this framework, an environment with hosts, switches, brokers, and controllers is
required. Starting at the host, an agent is developed to simulate security events based on
the most frequently occurring on the AF network. These events include malware detection,
unauthorized meida, authentication, and registry modification. To simulate these events,
upon initialization the agent uses a list of randomly generated security events provided by
the DSCSTest.py module and sends an encrypted message to the SDN application through
the AMQP broker. The SDN application retrieves queued messages and determines what
flow table updates are necessary. Depending on the scenario and the host’s flow profile,
OpenFlow updates are sent to all managed switching devices. Agents can only request
flow table updates to the IP address of their assigned host, and the controller will only
implement updates from trusted hosts.
Measurements are taken to quantify the Message Delivery Time (MDT) (from host to
SDN application), Event Completion Time (ECT) (time from event triggered to flow table
update), and Event Success Rate (ESR) (if the changes accomplished the desired effect).
These metrics are analyzed to determine how fast and effective flow table updates are made
based on dynamic host events. The number of hosts is held static at 5 during testing due to
system resource constraints, however the number of events is manipulated from 200 to 10000
per host. Since the application at the SDN controller could theoretically be implemented
at any SDN controller, Floodlight Section 2.2.6 is used since it is well established and has
a firewall module available.
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4.3 System Boundaries
As shown in Figure 18, the system under test (SUT) is the DSCS process. The com-
ponents of the system are the host agent (Agent.py), AMQP broker (RabbitMQ non-
clustered), Floodlight SDN controller, and the DSCS application. These components under
test (CUT) produce metrics for evaluating the system. The workload into the system is a















Figure 18. System Under Test
4.4 Parameters and Factors
This approach uses workload and system parameters. Parameters that vary during
the experiments are called factors. The range of values each factor can hold are called
levels. This section defines and explains each parameter and how it relates to the SUT. The
parameters held constant include the programming language, OS, memory, CPU, hardware
switch, and number of hosts. Table 4 presents factor levels for the number of events per
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host used in both experiments.
Table 4. Factors
Control Variable Experiment Tested Range Tested Levels
Events 1 1000-50,000 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, 50,000
Events 2 10,000-50,000 10,000, 50,000
4.4.1 Workload Parameters.
4.4.1.1 Events.
This parameter represents the number of events occurring in the network. These events
are created from each host running the agent and communicate through the message broker
to the SDN controller. Events are generated randomly and contain an encrypted text string
of approximately 240 bytes with the pertinent event data. The number of events is specified
in the agent configuration and how they are generated is explained in Section 3.3.1.1.
4.4.2 System Parameters.
Figure 18 identifies the computing parameters as language, OS, memory, CPU, hardware
switch, and hosts. The agent is written in Python, however, any programming language
with the AMQP library is sufficient. Since the DSCS process is OS independent, Windows
7 is used to represent the most common host on a production network. Next, memory
capacity and CPUs for each host is set to 4 gigabytes and 2 cores, respectively, allowing
for minimal delay due to system resources. All traffic routes through a hardware switch
(HP5900) and is manged by the Floodlight controller DSCS module. Finally, 5 hosts are
used to send different levels of events.
4.4.3 Performance Metrics.
This research focuses on three performance metrics. ECT measures how quickly the
system can react to a security event detected on a host. More specifically, the wall clock
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time from when the event is triggered to the flow table update on the switch. As in a real
world implementation, not every event will require a flow table update. However, all events
are included when calculating metrics.
MDT measures the time taken for messages transfered from host to controller through
an AMQP broker. This metric presents a view on how fast and resilient secure AMQP
messaging responds under different levels of events. The AMQP protocol is robust and is
not expected to fail even under high load.
ESR measures the rate messages are triggered, transmitted, and successfully executed.
Each message (event) is tracked from host to SDN application. If the event requires a flow
table update, a check is performed to verify the appropriate change was applied. Upon
verification the check is a PASS, otherwise it is a FAIL. The ratio of the sum of PASS to
total events triggered is the final event success rate.
4.5 Experimental Design
4.5.1 Overview.
Two experiments are designed to address the goals posed in Section 4.1. The SUT is
evaluated for efficiency and effectiveness by testing different numbers of events. To minimize
experimental bias, identical systems are used to host all virtual machines and each host has
a unique network interface card (NIC). Additionally, all hosts are identical within their
respective OS version and have the same alloted CPU and memory values. Each event is
randomly selected to ensure all event types are considered equally and not selected with
bias. Tests are automated using the scripts in Section 4.7.2 and the controller is restarted
between each test to ensure system state is the same during each run.
4.5.2 Data Processing.
Figure 19 provides a high level view of the process used to evaluate data captured
during each experiment. For each run, all data are consolidated into a single data file (e.g.,
1000 r1.csv contains the first trial of 1000 observations). After all trials are complete, the
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data are parsed using R into one table per file. The mean for each metric is calculated for
each table and stored in a single table with 30 entires. This final table with the mean of
means is represented using tables, plots, and if appropriate a linear model. This approach of
using sample means is applied because the data collected is not normally distributed. The
Central Limit Theorem asserts that given a sufficiently large sample size, samples means
are approximately normally distributed [49].
       MDT: Agent Message Time + 
                  Controller Consume Time
       ECT: MDT + Controller Update Time
Calculate mean of 
means for each 
metric per level
Summary of data
Pairs, Box plot, 
Linear Model
1000_r1.csv
Experiment 1 – 1000 events
30 trials
(Within R) 1 table per file 
1000 rows
1 Table 30 
rows of means
Figure 19. Data Processing Diagram
4.5.3 Determining Sample Size.
During experimentation a two sample power t-test using R [50] is used to determine
the number of samples to achieve a 95% confidence of one millisecond difference with 90%
power. With the observed maximum standard deviation of 3.65, approximately 281 events
per group are required to achieve 95% confidence (R Code in Appendix B). Given this
46
information, both experiments use event levels starting at 1,000 and increase up to 50,000.
4.5.4 Test Timing.
Synchronizing events to occur at approximately the same time is important to test max-
imum throughput of the system and is verified by monitoring the message broker (Secu-
taterityState) queue. This display provides statistics of the queued messages and message
rates (e.g, published, delivered, acknowledged) over the past minute. Synchronization is
achieved using scripts with a simple TCP client and server to start sending events across
all hosts at approximately the same time using netcat [51].
4.6 Evaluation Technique
The results are evaluated using R to perform statistical analysis. Event completion time
and message delivery time are evaluated using a one-sample t-test and by computing the
standard deviation, mean, and 95% confidence interval.
The MDT is comprised of the time taken to send the message from the agent to the
broker plus the time for the controller to consume the message. The agent uses the Python
time library to measure the elapsed time to send and receive a message delivery confirmation
from the broker. This value is stored in the agentData array until it is sent to the controller
to build the data file using the sendSyncData() function. As the message is consumed by the
controller, the Java System.nanoTime() function is used to measure the time the controller
takes to receive the message. This time is converted to milliseconds and stored in the node
object consumerDataLog array.
The ECT is comprised of message delivery time plus the time taken to apply any rules
to the firewall using the REST API. The Java System.nanoTime() is used to measure
the elapsed time between the REST POST and HttpURLConnection 200 response from the
firewall. MDT and ECT are defined as:
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MDT = Time(Agent Send) + Time(Controller Receive) (2)
ECT = MDT + Time(Firewall REST Transaction) (3)
The ESR is evaluated by tracking and verifying each flow table update. Reasons for
failure include a dropped message or error at the broker, SDN controller, or switch. The
component responsible for failure is tracked by noting the last successful step completed
during the data collection sequence. Event success rate is further verified by inspection
of the running firewall configuration. As shown in Figure 20, the command curl -X GET
http://localhost:8080/wm/firewall/rules/json returns the current ACL, where the
ruleid, source port, destination port, and action are verified.
Figure 20. Firewall Access Control List
4.7 Experimental Setup
4.7.1 Overview of Setup.
The test environment, as shown in Figure 21, includes two physical servers and one
hardware switch. The servers are both SuperMicro SuperServers 8027R-TRF+ with a Xeon
E5-4600 v2, eight 1000BASE-T network interface cards, 12 cores, and 384GB of RAM. The
switch is a HP 5900 Series switch (model JG336A)[52] with OpenFlow 1.3 support. Each
SuperMicro hosts several guest virtual machines. Windows 7 64-bit (BUILD 6.1.7601)
guests are assigned two cores, four gigabytes of RAM, and run the DSCS agent to register
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as nodes in the DSCS controlled network. The two Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit (Linux 3.13.0-63)
hosts are assigned two cores, four gigabytes of RAM, and used for the SDN controller and





VM 2 VM 3
VM 1
Figure 21. Experiment Environment
4.7.2 Experimental scripts.
In order to start events at approximately the same time, scripts are used to listen for
and receive a flat text configuration file containing the number of events to send from each
agent. Receipt of this file also notifies the agents to start sending the number of events
specified in the transmitted configuration file to the broker.
collect.bat.
• Collet.bat is executed at each agent before start.sh and starts simple netcat connection
server listening on port 55555 to receive the test configuration file.
Agent.py.
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• Agent.py is executed on each agent after collect.bat and starts the DSCS agent on the
host.
start.sh.
• Start.sh is executed on the broker and starts a netcat connection to agents awaiting
the test configuration file (named CONFIG).
process data.sh (n) (m).
• Process data.sh is executed on the controller and checks the individual data files for
correctness (i.e., number of lines and size), and merges all five files into one data file
where n is the level (e.g., 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, or 50,000) and m is the trial index.
Test process. Both experiments consist of a set of trails. In each trial, the fol-
lowing steps are followed:
1. Start all agents and listen for the configuration file using collect.bat (e.g., netcat -lp
55555 > start.dat).
2. Initialize controller and ensure connectivity with switch.
3. Set configuration file with event size parameters.
4. Start collection from broker using start.sh (e.g., netcat 192.168.2.110 55555 <
CONFIG).
5. Merge data into a single file per test using process data.sh.
4.8 Methodology Summary
This chapter describes the methodology used to measure the efficiency and effectiveness
of the DSCS framework. The experiments use different workload event levels to determine
the operating capacity of the system. Data collection is built into both the agent and SDN
controller to account for the time required to send, receive, and process events. Events
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are randomly generated at each agent and transferred without delay to the broker and
subsequently consumed by the controller. The workload is evenly distributed between the
5 hosts (agents). Within the controller, each registered node tracks events processed by the
associated agent to record timing data.
Both experiments use scripts to synchronize and automate initialization and data col-
lection. The number of generated events is varied and multiple trials at each level are
performed. Collection, aggregation, and formatting of data is also manged using scripts.
The experiments are evaluated by measuring the time required to send messages to
the controller. Since the controller is continually waiting to consume the next available
message, possible queuing delay is accounted for in this measurement. Next, the time taken
to transfer the event message and take action if required is measured. By combining the
message delivery time with the controller processing time, the total event completion time
is quantified. Finally, event accountability from end-to-end is monitored and reported as
the ratio of successful to total events.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Summary of Results
Table 5 contains a summary of results for both experiments. As shown in the top section,
Experiment 1 indicates as the event level increases, so too does the event completion time
and message delivery time. All levels tested reported less than 5.3 milliseconds from host
agent to initiate flow table updates on the controller. Additionally, 100% of the events were
successfully handled by the controller. Experiment 2 provides somewhat counterintuitive
metrics at first review as seen in the bottom section of Table 5. Event completion time
reportedly decreased as the number of events increased, while message delivery time changed
very little. However, Experiment 2 is designed to observe the back end of the system (Broker
→ Controller→ Switch update). This is achieved by filling the queue with messages before
initiating the controller (consumer) thereby reducing consumer message time significantly.
The first cause for this reduced ECT is that the controller retrieves messages from the
broker as quickly as possible. This eliminates the delay introduced by the peak message
rate of each host being 40 msg./sec.
The second reason is the controller update time during system startup. Until a stable
system state is reached (approximately 3,000 events), it is difficult to report an accurate
steady running state. To better represent this mean, Table 6 provides statistics excluding
the first 3,000 events highlighted in Figure 22.
Table 5. Experiment 1 and 2 - Summary of Results
Events Experiment ECT (ms) MDT(ms) ESR 95% conf.(ECT) p-value
1,000 1 4.09 1.64 100% 4.06 - 4.13 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 1 4.73 2.98 100% 4.70 - 4.76 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 1 4.98 3.39 100% 4.95 - 5.01 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1 5.27 3.88 100% 5.25 - 5.29 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 2 3.08 1.46 100% 3.06 - 3.08 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 2 2.89 1.54 100% 2.87 - 2.90 < 2.2 e−16
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Table 6. Experiment 2 - Summary Excluding First 3K Events
Events Experiment ECT (ms) MDT (ms) ESR 95% conf.(ECT) p-value
7,000 2 2.86 1.45 100% 2.85 - 2.87 < 2.2 e−16
47,000 2 2.84 1.54 100% 2.82 - 2.86 < 2.2 e−16
Figure 22. Steady System State
The solid line formed near zero across the bottom of the graph in Figure 22 are ob-
servations that require little action from the controller and therefore near zero processing
time. These events cause the mean controller update time to decrease as the treatment
level increases.
Figure 23 plots in red the four ECT points provided in Table 5. By fitting a linear
model of y as function of log(x), the black line suggests a logarithmic relationship between
the number of events and ECT. Using this model, the following equations are derived using
R. (R code in Appendix C, Figures 41 and 43):
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y = 0.30343 log(x) + 4.17398 (4)
y[95% Upper] = 0.495449 ∗ log(x) + 4.636387 (5)
y[95% Lower] = 0.111413 ∗ log(x) + 3.711582 (6)
To test (4), a single run at 100,000 events is performed resulting in a 5.23 ECT. The
model in (4) at x = 100 (in thousands of events) returns a 5.57 ECT. The single run 5.23
ECT is within the predicted 95% interval of 4.22 to 6.92 milliseconds and shown as ’*’ in
Figure 23. Therefore, the model successfully predicted the result within 95% confidence.
Additionally, the R2 value of 0.96 indicates 96% of the variance in the test data is explained
by the model.
Figure 23. Experiment 1 - Event Completion Time Model
Figure 24 shows MDT also performs logarithmically. Since ECT includes MDT and
controller update time (found to stay relatively static), the logarithmic performance of
ECT is contributed to MDT.
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Figure 24. Experiment 1 - Message Delivery Time Prediction
5.2 Experiment 1: DSCS Full System
Table 5 in Section 5.1 provided a high-level summary of results for Experiment 1. The
following figures and analysis present a more detailed look at the collected data. This data
and the associated R code is found in Appendix C.
5.2.1 System Performance and Efficiency.
Table 7 summarizes mean elapsed time for each level tested and associated effective
message rates. As expected, the elapsed time is approximately linear. However, the effective
message rates reached a peak of 195 msg./sec. and did not increase based on treatment level.
Upon closer inspection of RabbitMQ logs as seen in Appendix B for all levels (1,000-50,000),
the maximum publish and consume rates peak at approximately 200 msg./sec., resulting
in each host sending an average of (200 msgsec ÷ 5 hosts) 40 msg./sec. It is important
to remember the DSCS system is designed to send messages (events) based on configured
security triggers. Therefore if more than a few msg./sec. per host are triggered, network
administrators would be notified immediately.
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Table 7. Experiment 1 - Trials Elapsed Time (sec)
Level Mean Msg./Sec. Std Dev Min Median Max
1,000 5.43 183.85 0.15 5.15 5.42 5.78
5,000 25.77 193.99 0.25 25.22 25.77 26.27
10,000 51.44 194.40 0.43 50.57 51.36 52.50
50,000 255.50 195.69 1.49 252.8 255.3 258.5
5.2.2 Message Delivery Time.
MDT is the first metric directly observed consisting of both agent and consumer message
time, e.g., the time it takes to send a message from the agent to the broker, and then from the
broker to the consumer respectively. The following sections discuss these two components
in detail.
5.2.2.1 Agent Message Time.
Agent message time is relatively static and does not change as the level of events in-
creases. As determined above, irrespective of the number of events, each host sends 40
msg/sec. Table 8 and Figure 25 present how the message time is not impacted by the
number of events flowing through the system by eventually reaching 1.38 milliseconds.
Table 8. Experiment 1 - Agent Message Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
1,000 1.41 0.88 1.35 1.41 1.49 1.40 - 1.42 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 1.40 0.02 1.35 1.40 1.46 1.39 - 1.40 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 1.39 0.02 1.36 1.40 1.46 1.39 - 1.40 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1.38 0.01 1.36 1.39 1.40 1.38 - 1.39 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 25. Experiment 1 - Agent Message Time Summary
5.2.2.2 Consumer Message Time.
Unlike agent message time, consumer message time, or the time taken for the SDN
controller to retrieve a message from the broker, does increase event level. Table 9 shows
an approximate logarithmic increase in the mean consumer message time. This growth
occurs as the number of events increase and each host reaches the maximum message rate
of approximately 40 msg/sec. Additionally, it is believed this increase is caused by the
sustained processing of events as the controller module competes for resources from the OS.
Table 9. Experiment 1 - Consumer Message Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
1,000 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.23 0.35 0.21 - 0.24 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 1.58 0.08 1.33 1.61 1.72 1.54 - 1.61 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 2.00 0.10 1.80 2.00 2.20 1.96 - 2.04 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 2.50 0.04 2.38 2.49 2.59 2.47 - 2.51 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 26. Experiment 1 - Mean Consumer Message Time Summary
5.2.2.3 MDT Summary.
MDT is the sum of both agent and consumer message times. As shown in Table 8, agent
message time is relatively static and not directly impacted by the treatment. However, Table
10 and Figure 27 show how consumer message time responds as the controller is required to
process more events over time. MDT grows even though the message rate of approximately
200 msg/sec does not increase. It is believed this increase in time occurs as the controller
must compete for system resources to process the growing number of events.
Table 10. Experiment 1 - Message Delivery Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
1,000 1.64 0.04 1.55 1.63 1.73 1.62 - 1.66 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 2.97 0.10 2.68 2.99 3.18 2.94 - 3.02 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 3.39 0.12 3.17 3.41 3.65 3.35 - 3.44 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 3.88 0.04 3.77 3.87 3.99 3.86 - 3.89 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 27. Experiment 1 - Mean Message Delivery Time Summary
5.2.3 Event Success Rate.
ESR is the next metric observed during testing and is a ratio of successful to total events
processed. Across all trails every event was processed successfully resulting in a 100% ESR
for all levels. During these observations, the level of events did not affect updates performed
by the controller. ESR would have been impacted if the system experienced a critical fault.
5.2.4 Event Completion Time.
ECT is the final metric observed during testing and is the elapsed time required to
trigger, communicate, and apply flow table updates at the controller. As described by (3)
in Section 4.6, ECT is the sum of MDT and firewall REST transaction time.
5.2.4.1 Controller Update Time.
Controller update time consists of controller processing and firewall REST transactions
and varies the most at system startup. Figure 28 illustrates how at 10,000 events approxi-
mately the first third of the observations are trending downward towards the steady system
state. This leveling is observed only in controller update time and as the controller has
not yet reached a normal operating state, e.g., nodes are created and added to the network
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data structure. In this experiment the complete dataset to include the ramp-up period is
included when calculating the statistics in Table 11 and Figure 29. Treatment level 1,000
is much higher because the startup period represents a larger proportion of the total treat-
ment. However, if the ramp-up period is ignored, the mean would be relatively static and
not respond to the treatment level as demonstrated in Experiment 2.
Table 11. Experiment 1 - Controller Update Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
1,000 2.45 0.09 2.27 2.44 2.63 2.42 - 2.49 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 1.75 0.04 1.7 1.75 1.83 1.74 - 1.77 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 1.59 0.05 1.52 1.58 1.69 1.57 - 1.60 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1.39 0.01 1.36 1.39 1.43 1.39 - 1.40 < 2.2 e−16
Figure 28. Experiment 1 - Leveling Controller Update Time
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Figure 29. Experiment 1 - Mean Controller Update Time Summary
5.2.4.2 ECT Summary.
ECT is the sum of MDT and controller update time for each event respectively. As
shown in Table 10, MDT increases along with the treatment level primarily due to consumer
message time. However, controller update time tends towards a mean of approximately
1.42 milliseconds across all treatment levels indicating a relatively static result for all values
tested. Table 12 and Figure 30 demonstrate how ECT does increase per treatment level as
expected.
Table 12. Experiment 1 - Event Completion Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
1,000 4.09 0.09 3.94 4.08 4.33 4.06 - 4.12 < 2.2 e−16
5,000 4.73 0.08 4.51 4.74 4.90 4.70 - 4.76 < 2.2 e−16
10,000 4.98 0.08 4.84 4.98 5.18 4.95 - 5.01 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 5.27 0.04 5.20 5.27 5.36 5.25 - 5.29 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 30. Experiment 1 - Mean Event Completion Time Summary
5.3 Experiment 2: Back End (Preload Broker)
Unlike Experiment 1, this test attempts to analyze the back end of the DSCS system
for two reasons. First, the test environment does not support enough hosts to test the
maximum consume rate of the controller. Learning the maximum consume rate will provide
insight into how many hosts this environment can support. Next is to test the system at
a higher rate than 200 events/sec (the maximum Experiment 1 is capable of performing).
The results from this experiment provide data to help explain if the DSCS system could
scale in a larger environment. While the configuration did not change from Experiment 1,
the broker is preloaded with events before enabling the controller (consumer).
5.3.1 System Performance and Efficiency.
All reported statistics for Experiment 2 include events after the first 3,000 where ap-
proximately a steady running state is achieved. The following figures and analysis present
a closer look at the collected data. Appendix D provides additional detail and associated
R code. Table 13 shows mean elapsed time for each level tested and associated effective
message rates.
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Like Experiment 1, the time required to perform the tests is approximately linear.
However, the effective message rate reached a peak of 380 msg./sec. and did increase based
on treatment level. Referencing the RabbitMQ logs in Appendix D for both 10,000 and
50,000, the maximum consume rate reached 600 msg./sec. This is a drastic increase from
200 msg./sec. in Experiment 1. This reveals the broker in this configuration could process
from one msg./sec. (380 hosts) to 40 msg./sec. (9 hosts) without delay from hosts to
controller. It is important to note that in a production environment events may not occur
every second or even every minute.
Table 13. Experiment 2 - Trial Elapsed Time (sec)
Level Mean Msg./Sec.Rate Std Dev Min Median Max
10,000 33 303.10 1.55 30.00 32.95 40.00
50,000 131.3 380.68 1.61 129.10 130.90 136.50
5.3.2 Message Delivery Time.
MDT for Experiment 2 still consists of agent message time and consumer message time,
but should not be directly compared to results in Experiment 1 since messages are preloaded
on the broker. This results in a relatively static MDT even as the treatment level increases.
5.3.2.1 Agent Message Time.
Similar to Experiment 1, agent message time is relatively static and does not significantly
change as the treatment level increases. Table 14 and Figure 31 present statistics and show
agent message time ranges between 1.28 to 1.44 milliseconds.
Table 14. Experiment 2 - Agent Message Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
10,000 1.33 0.02 1.28 1.33 1.39 1.32 - 1.34 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1.39 0.04 1.31 1.41 1.44 1.37 - 1.40 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 31. Experiment 2 - Mean Agent Message Time Summary
5.3.2.2 Consumer Message Time.
Since the controller is not required to wait on agents to send events, consumer message
time does not increase significantly with treatment level. This is expected as all messages
are preloaded before the controller is started. Table 15 and Figure 32 show this slight
increase. Unlike Experiment 1, the controller does not have to wait on agents to send
messages. The slight increase of mean is believed to be caused by read time from retrieving
messages stored on disk within the broker.
Table 15. Experiment 2 - Consumer Message Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
10,000 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.12 - 0.13 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 0.16 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 - 0.16 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 32. Experiment 2 - Mean Consumer Message Time Summary
5.3.2.3 MDT Summary.
Table 16 and Figure 33 show MDT does slightly increase but is not as significantly as
Experiment 1. Since the system is preloaded with messages, the consumer is not forced to
wait for messages to arrive in the broker queue. Therefore the small increase is attributed
to the number of messages stored on disk and associated access time.
Table 16. Experiment 2 - Message Delivery Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
10,000 1.45 0.02 1.40 1.46 1.52 1.44 - 1.46 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1.54 0.05 1.45 1.56 1.60 1.53 - 1.56 < 2.2 e−16
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Figure 33. Experiment 2 - Mean Message Delivery Time Summary
5.3.3 Event Success Rate.
ESR for this experiment is 100%. This means as the controller (consumer) works at
the peak speed of 380 msg./sec., every event is processed from agent to flow table update
successfully.
5.3.4 Event Completion Time.
Much like Experiment 1, ECT decreases as the treatment level increase but is trending
towards the same mean. This behavior is expected as many events do not require a firewall
modification and therefore have a near zero processing time.
5.3.4.1 Controller Update Time.
Though the two trials are statisticaly different as seen in Figure 34 and Table 17, the
mean time to update the controller is less than 1.5 milliseconds. This decrease in update
time, though statistically different, is believed to converge at the same mean as discussed
in Section 5.1.
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Table 17. Experiment 2 - Controller Update Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
10,000 1.41 0.03 1.35 1.41 1.47 1.39 - 1.42 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 1.30 0.01 1.26 1.29 1.34 1.29 - 1.30 < 2.2 e−16
Figure 34. Experiment 2 - Mean Controller Update Time Summary
5.3.4.2 ECT Summary.
ECT for both treatment levels are very similar. Even though message delivery time
increases with treatment level, consumer update time decreases by approximately the same
amount (0.10 millisecond). This occurs as the mean controller update time continues to
decrease and more events with less processing time are encountered. Unlike Experiment
1, since MDT did not increase significantly (due to preloaded broker), this behavior is
expected.
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Table 18. Experiment 2 - Event Completion Time (ms)
Level Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 95% Conf p-value
10,000 2.86 0.04 2.80 2.86 2.94 2.85 - 2.87 < 2.2 e−16
50,000 2.84 0.05 2.74 2.86 2.90 2.82 - 2.86 < 2.2 e−16
Figure 35. Experiment 2 - Mean Event Completion Time Summary
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the research performed. Section 6.2 presents the conclusions
reached during experimentation. Section 6.3 discusses the impact of this research. Section
6.4 presents potential future work.
6.2 Research Conclusions
This research is successful in achieving the goal of developing the DSCS framework
to manage layer-2 flow tables initiated from host-based events. As hypothesized, event
completion time increased with the number of events and event success rate was 100%.
However, message delivery time did not stay the same as expected and is the main factor
for additional delay as event level increases. Using the design in Chapter 3 and goals in
Section 4.1, the framework is tested and found to satisfy the desired efficiency, effectiveness,
and ease of implementation.
6.2.1 Efficiency.
Results show flow table updates are made for all tested levels in less than 5.27 millisec-
onds. This indicates near real-time modification of flow tables which is well below the stated
goal of one second (Section 1.3). Additionally, as the number of events processed increases
from 1,000 to 50,000, the design scales logarithmically due to MDT and is limited primarily
by the message rate of the agent (40 msg./sec.). Experiment 2 provides insight into the
maximum effective consume rate of the controller at 380 msg./sec. (e.g., one controller can
support up to 380 hosts at one msg./sec.).
6.2.2 Effectiveness.
Every event is successfully processed for both experiments resulting in a 100% ESR.
Since the broker uses authentication and SSL when messaging, the contents are protected
69
from snooping. While the critical route and flow based profiles features were not directly
tested in either experiment, all routes added are verified. Each firewall rule is applied
immediately except for those with active connections.
6.2.3 Ease of implementation.
As demonstrated in both experiments, AMQP messaging is platform independent by
design and available in most mainstream operating systems. Windows 7 is used in this
research to support the use of DSCS in the most common of environments. Little configu-
ration is required on the host agent, only requiring authentication credentials and custom
modules to interface with existing security software (anti-virus, HBSS, etc.).
6.3 Significance of Research
6.3.1 Contributions.
The main drive for this research is to take advantage of security event information at
endpoints and propagate this awareness to forwarding devices using SDN. This research
provides three contributions unique to DSCS. First, it applies network protection across
layer-2 devices based on host-level security events. This approach helps mitigate the chance
of an adversary moving laterally within a network once a compromise is discovered. Next,
DSCS uses host security index tracking within the SDN controller to monitor individual
systems and notify network administrators when appropriate. Finally, this system allows
for customized flow-based profiles to ensure critical routes are available to avoid mission
interruption when security events occur. Critical routes allow for a more targeted response
instead of blocking all host communications.
6.3.2 Applications.
DSCS is appropriate for any environment with the desire to bolster network defenses
with information gathered from hosts. However, this framework was designed for organiza-
tions with many hosts and locations in mind.
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6.4 Future Work
While there are many possibilities for additional research within the DSCS system,
the following are particularly interesting because of the impact on incident recovery and
response. The first and most extensive is to incorporate a database to allow for multiple
networks or locations to share event information and push flow table updates to all switches,
allowing DSCS to scale to support an entire enterprise.
Another feature is to incorporate system artifact collection into the agent. Artifacts
such as system logs (event, application, software, security, etc.), memory capture, and IP
traffic capturing. These logs can be preserved and transfered to an analysis platform to
speed up response and recovery actions. After automated analysis using a tool such as
Anubis [53], the results can be parsed and malicious addresses added as a deny flow table
entry.
A key limitation of this research is the Floodlight Stateless Firewall used during develop-
ment could not interrupt active connections even if they were found to be malicious. Future
work could address this problem by modifying the agent to kill all active connections to
malicious addresses before sending a block event. Another approach is to use the controller
to interrupt active connections before updating the flow table.
The DSCS system should also be tested in an environment where the agent actually
interfaces with a detection system. This can be accomplished using the same test environ-
ment as this research. Next an interface between detection software (anti-virus, HBSS, etc.)
and the agent is required. The agent must then be configured to trigger based on detection
system flags. Finally, security policy on the victim systems must be violated in such a way
the detection system identifies the attack.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In summary, this chapter presents the research conclusions and significance for this
research. Additionally, the applications and ideas for future work to expand on the DSCS
framework is discussed.
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Appendix B. Power Test for Sample Size
Power t e s t for one t r i a l at 1000 samples , for Event Completion Time in Experiment 1 .
Event Completion Time ( the g r e a t e s t var i ance o f a l l metr i c s )
> var (1000 r1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ )
[ 1 ] 13 .01189
> sd (1000 r1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ )
[ 1 ] 3 .607199
> power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = 3.607199)
Two−sample t t e s t power c a l c u l a t i o n
n = 274.4067
de l t a = 1
sd = 3.607199
s i g . l e v e l = 0 .05
power = 0 .9
a l t e r n a t i v e = two . s ided
Power t e s t for one t r i a l at 10000 samples , for Event Completion Time in Experiment 2 .
Event Completion Time ( the g r e a t e s t var i ance o f a l l metr i c s )
> var ( r1 10000F2$tota l )
[ 1 ] 13 .34055
> sd ( r1 10000F2$tota l )
[ 1 ] 3 .652472
> power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = 3.652472)
Two−sample t t e s t power c a l c u l a t i o n
n = 281.3135
de l t a = 1
sd = 3.652472
s i g . l e v e l = 0 .05
power = 0 .9
a l t e r n a t i v e = two . s ided
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Appendix C. Experiment 1 Graphs and Supporting R Code
Experiment 1 - 1K Events Pairs
Experiment 1 - 5K Events Pairs
Figure 36. Experiment 1 - Pairs Plot 1K and 5K
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Experiment 1 - 10K Events Pairs
Experiment 1 - 50K Events Pairs
Figure 37. Experiment 1 - Pairs Plot 10K and 50K
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Figure 38. Experiment 1 - Agent Message Time and Consumer Message Time Data Plot
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Figure 39. Experiment 1 - Message Delivery Time and Controller Update Time Data Plot
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Figure 40. Experiment 1 - Event Completion Time Data Plot
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# Values from Experiment 1 , Table 8 ECT 1−50K
x = c (1 , 5 , 10 , 50)
y = c ( 4 . 0 9 , 4 . 73 , 4 . 98 , 5 . 27 )
# Linear model f o r y as a func t i on o f l o g ( x )
f i t <− lm(y˜ log (x ) )
# Sequence used to draw l ine , popu la ted by p r ed i c t func t i on below
xx <− seq (1 ,100 , l ength=50)
# Plot o f ECT data from Table 8 ( red )
p lo t (x , y , type=”b” , c o l=” red ” , xl im=c (1 , 100) , yl im=c ( 3 . 5 , 6 . 2 ) , main=”Event
↪→ Completion Time Model” , xlab = ”Events in thousands ” , ylab=”Event Completion
↪→ Time (ms) ” , lwd=1)
# Predic ted us ing f i t o f y˜ l o g ( x )
l i n e s ( xx , p r ed i c t ( f i t , data . frame (x=xx ) , c o l=”blue ” ) , lwd=1, l t y =1)
conf . l i n e s = pr ed i c t ( f i t , data . frame (x=xx ) , i n t e r v a l = ” con f idence ” )
l i n e s ( xx , conf . l i n e s [ , 2 ] , l t y =3, c o l=”blue ” )
l i n e s ( xx , conf . l i n e s [ , 3 ] , l t y =3, c o l=”blue ” )
> summary( f i t )
Ca l l :
lm( formula = y ˜ log (x ) )
Res idua l s :
1 2 3 4
−0.08398 0.06766 0.10734 −0.09102
Co e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Error t va lue Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) 4 .17398 0.10747 38 .839 0.000662 ∗∗∗
l og ( x ) 0 .30343 0.04463 6 .799 0.020954 ∗
−−−
S i g n i f . codes : 0 ∗∗∗ 0 .001 ∗∗ 0 .01 ∗ 0 .05 . 0 . 1 1
Res idua l standard e r r o r : 0 .1254 on 2 degree s o f freedom
Mult ip l e R−squared : 0 .9585 , Adjusted R−squared : 0 .9378
F−s t a t i s t i c : 46 .23 on 1 and 2 DF, p−value : 0 .02095
#y−pred i c t ed va lue s in equat ion form y=mx+b , where x = log ( x )
> 0.30343 ∗ l og (60) + 4.17398
[ 1 ] 5 .416327
> 0.30343 ∗ l og (70) + 4.17398
[ 1 ] 5 .463101
> 0.30343 ∗ l og (80) + 4.17398
[ 1 ] 5 .503618
> 0.30343 ∗ l og (100) + 4.17398
[ 1 ] 5 .571327
Figure 41. R Code - Linear Model Fit Log(x) ECT
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# Values from Table 8 MDT 1−50K
x = c (1 , 5 , 10 , 50)
y = c ( 1 . 6 4 , 2 . 98 , 3 . 39 , 3 . 88 )
# Linear model f o r y as a func t i on o f l o g ( x )
f i t <− lm(y˜ log (x ) )
# Sequence used to draw l ine , popu la ted by p r ed i c t func t i on below
xx <− seq (1 ,100 , l ength=50)
# Plot o f ECT data from Table 8 ( red )
p lo t (x , y , type=”o” , c o l=” red ” , xl im=c (1 , 100) , yl im=c (1 , 5) , main=”Message De l ive ry
↪→ Time Pred i c t i on ” , xlab = ”Events in thousands ” , ylab=”Message De l ive ry Time (
↪→ ms) ” )
#error . bars ( x , add )
# Predic ted us ing f i t o f y˜ l o g ( x )
l i n e s ( xx , p r ed i c t ( f i t , data . frame (x=xx ) , c o l=”blue ” ) )
> summary( f i t )
Ca l l :
lm( formula = y ˜ log (x ) )
Res idua l s :
1 2 3 4
−0.2114 0 .2061 0 .2189 −0.2136
Co e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Error t va lue Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) 1 .8514 0 .2577 7 .185 0 .0188 ∗
l og ( x ) 0 .5732 0 .1070 5 .357 0 .0331 ∗
−−−
S i g n i f . codes : 0 ∗∗∗ 0 .001 ∗∗ 0 .01 ∗ 0 .05 . 0 . 1 1
Res idua l standard e r r o r : 0 .3006 on 2 degree s o f freedom
Mult ip l e R−squared : 0 .9348 , Adjusted R−squared : 0 .9023
F−s t a t i s t i c : 28 .7 on 1 and 2 DF, p−value : 0 .03313
> 0 .5732 ∗ l og (60) + 1.8514
[ 1 ] 4 .198278
> 0 .5732 ∗ l og (70) + 1.8514
[ 1 ] 4 .286637
> 0 .5732 ∗ l og (80) + 1.8514
[ 1 ] 4 .363178
> 0 .5732 ∗ l og (100) + 1.8514
[ 1 ] 4 .491084
>
Figure 42. R Code - Linear Model Fit Log(x) MDT
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# 95% Confidence f o r Linear model : y ˜ l o g ( x )
f i t <− lm(y˜ log (x ) )
> f i t
Ca l l :
lm( formula = y ˜ log (x ) )
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
( I n t e r c ep t ) l og (x )
4 .17398 0.30343
> c on f i n t ( f i t , l e v e l = 0 . 95 )
2 .5 % 97 .5 %
( In t e r c ep t ) 3 .7115828 4.6363870
log (x ) 0 .1114132 0.4954494
# Lower
> 0.11141 ∗ l og (100) + 3.71158
[ 1 ] 4 .22466
# Upper
> 0.49545 ∗ l og (100) + 4.63639
[ 1 ] 6 .91802






Figure 46. Experiment 1 - RabbitMQ Broker Message Rates
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#### 10000
# read in raw f i l e s
r1 10000F1 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF1 1 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
r2 10000F1 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF1 2 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
r3 10000F1 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF1 3 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
<snipped>
r30 10000F1 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF1 30 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
# Event complet ion time
r1 10000F1$tota l <− rowSums( r1 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
r2 10000F1$tota l <− rowSums( r2 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
r3 10000F1$tota l <− rowSums( r3 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
<snipped>
r30 10000F1$tota l <− rowSums( r30 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
# Message d e l i v e r y time
r1 10000F1$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r1 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
r2 10000F1$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r2 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
r3 10000F1$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r3 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
<snipped>
r30 10000F1$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r30 10000F1 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
V2 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r2 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r3 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean(
↪→ r4 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r5 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r6 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r7 10000F1$V2 ) ,
↪→ mean( r8 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r9 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r10 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean(
↪→ r11 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r12 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r13 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r14 10000F1$V2 )
↪→ ,mean( r15 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r16 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r17 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean(
↪→ r18 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r19 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r20 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r21 10000F1$V2 )
↪→ ,mean( r22 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r23 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r24 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean(
↪→ r25 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r26 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r27 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r28 10000F1$V2 )
↪→ ,mean( r29 10000F1$V2 ) ,mean( r30 10000F1$V2 ) )
V3 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$V3 ) , mean( r2 10000F1$V3 ) , mean( r3 10000F1$V3 ) ,
↪→ mean( r4 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r5 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r6 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r7 10000F1$V3
↪→ ) ,mean( r8 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r9 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r10 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean(
↪→ r11 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r12 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r13 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r14 10000F1$V3 )
↪→ ,mean( r15 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r16 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r17 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean(
↪→ r18 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r19 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r20 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r21 10000F1$V3 )
↪→ ,mean( r22 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r23 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r24 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean(
↪→ r25 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r26 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r27 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r28 10000F1$V3 )
↪→ ,mean( r29 10000F1$V3 ) ,mean( r30 10000F1$V3 ) )
V4 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r2 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r3 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean(
↪→ r4 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r5 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r6 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r7 10000F1$V4 ) ,
↪→ mean( r8 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r9 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r10 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean(
↪→ r11 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r12 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r13 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r14 10000F1$V4 )
↪→ ,mean( r15 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r16 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r17 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean(
↪→ r18 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r19 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r20 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r21 10000F1$V4 )
↪→ ,mean( r22 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r23 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r24 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean(
↪→ r25 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r26 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r27 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r28 10000F1$V4 )
↪→ ,mean( r29 10000F1$V4 ) ,mean( r30 10000F1$V4 ) )
V5 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r2 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r3 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean(
↪→ r4 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r5 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r6 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r7 10000F1$V5 ) ,
↪→ mean( r8 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r9 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r10 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean(
↪→ r11 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r12 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r13 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r14 10000F1$V5 )
↪→ ,mean( r15 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r16 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r17 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean(
↪→ r18 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r19 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r20 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r21 10000F1$V5 )
↪→ ,mean( r22 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r23 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r24 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean(
↪→ r25 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r26 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r27 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r28 10000F1$V5 )
↪→ ,mean( r29 10000F1$V5 ) ,mean( r30 10000F1$V5 ) )
Figure 44. Experiment 1 - R Code
83
total 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$tota l ) ,mean( r2 10000F1$tota l ) , <snipped> ,mean
↪→ ( r28 10000F1$tota l ) ,mean( r29 10000F1$tota l ) ,mean( r30 10000F1$tota l ) )
msgDeliverTime 10000F1 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F1$msgDeliverTime ) ,mean(
↪→ r2 10000F1$msgDeliverTime ) , <snipped> ,mean( r29 10000F1$msgDeliverTime ) ,mean(
↪→ r30 10000F1$msgDeliverTime ) )
#Al l data combined fo r each l e v e l
comb 10000F1 = data . frame (V2 10000F1 mean , V3 10000F1 mean , V4 10000F1 mean ,
↪→ V5 10000F1 mean , total 10000F1 mean , msgDeliverTime 10000F1 mean )
#Add headings to each co l
names ( comb 10000F1 ) <− c ( ”Agent Message Time” , ”Consumer Message Time” , ” Con t r o l l e r
↪→ Update Time” , ”Event Succes Rate” , ”Event Completion Time” , ”Message De l ive ry
↪→ Time” )
#Disp lay pa i r s p l o t s
pa i r s ( comb 10000F1 )
#View summary o f data
summary( comb 10000F1 )
#Print out t a b l e formatted f o r l a t e x
paste (round(mean( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round( sd (
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round(min(
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round( quart (
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) [ 1 ] , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round(median (
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round( quart (
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) [ 2 ] , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” , round(max(
↪→ comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ) , d i g i t s =2) , ” & ” )
#power t e s t used to determine sample s i z e was s u f f i c i e n t
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Agent Msg Time ‘ )
↪→ )
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Consumer Msg
↪→ Time ‘ ) )
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r
↪→ Update Time ‘ ) )
##### Combined Data
# Agent Message Time by number o f e v en t t s 95% Conf
boxplot ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Agent Message Time ‘ , comb 50000F1$ ‘ Agent Message Time ‘ , names=c (
↪→ ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Agent Message Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events” )
# Consumer Message Time by number o f e v en t t s 95% Conf
boxplot ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Consumer Message Time ‘ , comb 50000F1$ ‘ Consumer Message Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Consumer Message Time (ms) by \n Number o f
↪→ Events” )
# Message De l i very Time by number o f event s
boxplot ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Message De l ive ry Time ‘ , comb 50000F1$ ‘ Message De l ive ry Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Message De l ive ry Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events
↪→ ” )
# Cont ro l l e r Update Time
boxplot ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r Update Time ‘ , comb 50000F1$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r Update Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Cont r o l l e r Update Time (ms) by \n Number o f
↪→ Events” )
# Event Completion Time
boxplot ( comb 10000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ , comb 50000F1$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Event Completion Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events
↪→ ” )
# Elapse Time
boxplot ( t imes10000 /1000000000 , t imes50000 /1000000000 , names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”
↪→ Elapse Time ( sec ) by \n Number o f Events” )
#### Timing data f o r t a b l e s in s e c t i on 5.2
# time i s in nanosecond , conver t to seconds
summary( t imes10000 /1000000000)
# mean msg ra te
10000/mean( times10000 /1000000000)
Figure 45. Experiment 1 - R Code Continued
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Appendix D. Experiment 2 Graphs and Supporting R Code
Experiment 2 - 10K Events Pairs
Experiment 2 - 50K Events Pairs
Figure 47. Experiment 2 - Pairs Plot 10K and 50K
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Figure 48. Experiment 1 - Agent Message Time Data Plot
86
Figure 49. Experiment 1 - Consumer Message Time Data Plot
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Figure 50. Experiment 1 - Message Delivery Time Data Plot
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Figure 51. Experiment 1 - Controller Update Time Data Plot
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Figure 53. Experiment 2 - RabbitMQ (Broker) Message Rates
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#### 10000
# read in raw f i l e s
r1 10000F2 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF2 1 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
r2 10000F2 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF2 2 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
r3 10000F2 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF2 3 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
<snipped>
r30 10000F2 = read . csv ( ”C:\\ Users \\mtodd\\Google Drive \\ ! Thes i s !\\ data \\FData\\10000
↪→ rF2 30 . csv ” , header = FALSE)
# Event complet ion time
r1 10000F2$tota l <− rowSums( r1 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
r2 10000F2$tota l <− rowSums( r2 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
r3 10000F2$tota l <− rowSums( r3 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
<snipped>
r30 10000F2$tota l <− rowSums( r30 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 , 4 ) ] )
# Message d e l i v e r y time
r1 10000F2$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r1 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
r2 10000F2$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r2 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
r3 10000F2$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r3 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
<snipped>
r30 10000F2$msgDeliverTime <− rowSums( r30 10000F2 [ , c ( 2 , 3 ) ] )
V2 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$V2 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean(
↪→ r2 10000F2$V2 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean( r3 10000F2$V2 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength (
↪→ r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) , .< snipped >. ,mean( r30 10000F2$V2 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 )
↪→ ] ) )
V3 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$V3 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V3 ) ] ) , mean(
↪→ r2 10000F2$V3 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V3 ) ] ) , mean( r3 10000F2$V3 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength (
↪→ r1 10000F2$V3 ) ] ) , .< snipped >. ,mean( r29 10000F2$V3 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V3 )
↪→ ] ) ,mean( r30 10000F2$V3 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V3 ) ] ) )
V4 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$V4 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V4 ) ] ) , . . . <snipped > . . .
↪→ ,mean( r30 10000F2$V4 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V4 ) ] ) )
V5 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$V5 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V5 ) ] ) , . . . <snipped > . . .
↪→ ,mean( r30 10000F2$V5 [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V5 ) ] ) )
Figure 54. Experiment 2 - R Code
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total 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$tota l [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean(
↪→ r2 10000F2$tota l [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) , <snipped> , mean(
↪→ r29 10000F2$tota l [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean( r30 10000F2$tota l ) )
msgDeliverTime 10000F2 mean = c (mean( r1 10000F2$msgDeliverTime [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength (
↪→ r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean( r2 10000F2$msgDeliverTime [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,
↪→ <snipped> ,mean( r29 10000F2$msgDeliverTime [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) ,mean(
↪→ r30 10000F2$msgDeliverTime [ 3 0 0 1 : l ength ( r1 10000F2$V2 ) ] ) )
#Al l data combined fo r each l e v e l
comb 10000F2 = data . frame (V2 10000F2 mean , V3 10000F2 mean , V4 10000F2 mean ,
↪→ V5 10000F2 mean , total 10000F2 mean , msgDeliverTime 10000F2 mean )
#Add headings to each co l
names ( comb 10000F2 ) <− c ( ”Agent Message Time” , ”Consumer Message Time” , ” Con t r o l l e r
↪→ Update Time” , ”Event Succes Rate” , ”Event Completion Time” , ”Message De l ive ry
↪→ Time” )
#Disp lay pa i r s p l o t s
pa i r s ( comb 10000F2 )
#View summary o f data
summary( comb 10000F2 )
#power t e s t used to determine sample s i z e was s u f f i c i e n t
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Agent Msg Time ‘ )
↪→ )
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Consumer Msg
↪→ Time ‘ ) )
power . t . t e s t (n = NULL, de l t a = 1 , power = .90 , sd = sd ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r
↪→ Update Time ‘ ) )
##### Combined Data
# Agent Message Time by number o f e v en t t s 95% Conf
boxplot ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Agent Message Time ‘ , comb 50000F2$ ‘ Agent Message Time ‘ , names=c (
↪→ ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Agent Message Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events” )
# Consumer Message Time by number o f e v en t t s 95% Conf
boxplot ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Consumer Message Time ‘ , comb 50000F2$ ‘ Consumer Message Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Consumer Message Time (ms) by \n Number o f
↪→ Events” )
# Message De l i very Time by number o f event s
boxplot ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Message De l ive ry Time ‘ , comb 50000F2$ ‘ Message De l ive ry Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Message De l ive ry Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events
↪→ ” )
# Cont ro l l e r Update Time
boxplot ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r Update Time ‘ , comb 50000F2$ ‘ Con t r o l l e r Update Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Cont r o l l e r Update Time (ms) by \n Number o f
↪→ Events” )
# Event Completion Time
boxplot ( comb 10000F2$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ , comb 50000F2$ ‘ Event Completion Time ‘ ,
↪→ names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”Event Completion Time (ms) by \n Number o f Events
↪→ ” )
# Elapse Time
boxplot ( t imes10000 /1000000000 , t imes50000 /1000000000 , names=c ( ”10K” , ”50K” ) , main=”
↪→ Elapse Time ( sec ) by \n Number o f Events” )
#### Timing data f o r t a b l e s in s e c t i on 5.2
# time i s in nanosecond , conver t to seconds
summary( t imes10000 /1000000000)
# mean msg ra te
10000/mean( times10000 /1000000000)
Figure 55. Experiment 2 - R Code Continued
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